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We analyze competition between two platforms with positive network externalities. Platforms can choose
to interconnect or alternatively, operate exclusively. We examine how this decision will aect pricing be-
haviour and incentives to invest in platform quality. We nd that interconnection is a means to reduce
externalities one side exerts on the other. It changes the mode of competition for subscribers and results
in higher subscription prices. Further, even though interconnection allows for quality spillovers to the rival
platform, it results in higher quality investment than the case of exclusive platforms. Coordination will
facilitate collusion on the lowest quality levels possible if its provision is costly. For low quality costs it
will lead to asymmetric networks. Therefore, interconnection without coordinated investment activities is
welfare maximising.
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11 Introduction
In order to provide universal service, competing telephony suppliers, like traditional xed
line and mobile providers but also Voice-over-IP platforms, must be able to interconnect.
Therefore, in Europe, the new regulatory framework of 2002 (Directive 2002/19/EC) encour-
ages the use of standards to achieve interoperability.1 This idea contradicts some network
providers' claim of exclusive operation. Referring to Schumpeter, J.A. (1943) the providers
argue that only the appropriability of innovation rents can stimulate investment incentives.
Yet, also the opposite viewpoint based on Arrow, K. (1962) exists and nds competition
necessary to spur innovation.
In this regard, European policy has - for the past few years - been concerned with the
question of how to further investment incentives and the role competition plays. For the
particular case of telecommunications and other network industries, the discussion ulti-
mately draws attention to the question whether rms will consent to a common standard.
This fundamentally aects the competitive environment since standardisation serves as a
pre-requisite for interoperability and interconnection: It determines whether there will be
intra- or inter-technology competition.
For this reason, we are interested in further examining the eect of rms' interoperability
choices on competition and subsequent quality investments. Motivated by the particular
example of telephony markets, we would like to explicitly consider two market characteris-
tics: Network externalities and the two-sidedness of such markets. The latter characteristic
describes the circumstance that markets can be regarded as platforms which serve as inter-
mediaries between two distinct groups of users. It is then that there are not only intra-group
but also inter-group externalities where one platform side aects the other. Referring to the
particular example of international phone calls via Voice-over-IP, we nd that this market
structure can be applicable to telephony markets where a provider serves to issue calls from
one particular group of users (e.g. telephone users of a certain country) to the other (e.g.
users of a dierent country) and vice versa.2
In our model, we nd that standardisation reduces price competition for subscribers and,
therefore, leads to higher subscription prices. Higher quality incentives are aligned with
higher prices as long as platforms do not coordinate their investments. Conversely, coordi-
nation bears the danger of collusion on minimum quality levels. Interestingly, this outcome
depends on costs of quality provision: If quality provision is rather costly, collusive under-
investment, indeed, can occur. Yet, for lower costs coordination results in the co-existence
of highly dierentiated platforms so that equilibrium market outcome is asymmetric. Con-
cludingly, non-cooperative investments of interoperable platforms turns out to be welfare
1 Common standards are published in the Directive 2002/19/EC on Access and Interconnection (related
to network interconnection, this mainly refers to application interfaces and transmission protocols).
2 It might also be a starting point to reect interaction of national stock exchanges or other trading
platforms.
2maximising whereas coordinated investment activities take an ambiguous role: For low cost
of quality provision, it produces the second-best outcome whereas it leads to a socially un-
desirable outcome for higher cost.
Our results rely on a multiplicative eect of quality in subscribers' utility function. Fur-
thermore, we assume that inter-platform transactions, i.e. communication between users of
competing platforms, can be characterized by the average transaction qualities of the two
platforms involved. We believe that this might be adequate to represent the quality of In-
ternet trac in terms of speed, reliability etc., but it is an empirical question of how to best
describe interacting qualities of two co-existent platforms. By our specication, consumers'
willingness to pay is aected both by quality and the network size of one platform or, given
a mutual agreement on interoperability, both platforms.
Formally, our basic model setup replicates competition between two existent platforms.
These platforms can agree on a common standard.3 If they do so, interconnection between
platforms is possible. On the contrary, if they decide against a common standard they will
operate independently and exclusively for their own customers. Platforms compete for sub-
scribers via a xed subscription fee corresponding to the prevalent oer of atrates in reality.
But before market competition takes place, platforms decide on the transaction quality they
provide for their intermediation service.
This setup builds on seminal literature of two-sided markets by Rochet, J.-C. and Tirole, J.
(2006) and, in particular, Armstrong, M. (2006) and Armstrong, M. and Wright, J. (2006).
Their main interest lies in analysing platform pricing considering various market structures.
In contrast to them, we restrict our view to duopolistic platform competition and the spe-
cial case of subscription to one platform only. Further, our analysis is related to traditional
literature on compatibility and standardization naming Farrell, J. and Saloner, G. (1985)
and Katz, M.L. and Shapiro, C. (1985) as the most prominent examples. These works deal
with the coordination problem of compatibility and investigate the social optimal degree of
it. We, instead, abstract from the coordination problem of achieving a common standard
and deal with the choice of full compatibility versus incompatibility only. Such restrained
view serves our idea to explore the strategic eects of compatibility on competition. As
we refer to telephone networks and discuss the implications of possible interconnection, we
restrict attention to a two-way agreement on compatibility.4 To incorporate quality aspects
in our model, we introduce an additional investment stage before competition in the mar-
ket takes place. Combined with the possibility of coordinating investments this builds on
D'Aspremont, C. and Jaquemin, A. (1988). Fundmental to our equilibrium analysis is the
concept of "fullled expectations" in terms of the expected network size. This concept has
3 As our main aim is to examine strategic eects of a bilateral compatibility decision, we abstract from
coordination problems and the idea of standards war.
4 More precisely, standardisation or not.
3been adopted by Katz, M.L. and Shapiro, C. (1985) and others before.5
In principal, also Schi, A. (2003) and Baake, P. and Boom, A. (2001) contemplate the
question of compatibility and competition. Schi, A. (2003) even does so regarding two-
sided markets. But he is concerned with nding an ecient market structure. Our approach
instead, is closer to Baake, P. and Boom, A. (2001) who examine duopolistic competition
referring to quality and compatibility as strategic choices. In terms of price competition, we
come to the same conclusion as them and nd that compatibility reduces price competition
for subscribers. Yet, our outcomes dier with respect to quality incentives as we rstly,
presume full instead of partial market coverage, and secondly, do not restrain our view on
asymmetric outcomes by assumption. As a result of our model specication, our ndings
not only rely on the extent of network externalities, but, additionally, the cost of quality
provision. According to Baake, P. and Boom, A. (2001), compatibility will always be in-
duced by duopoly competition. We, instead, claim that it can occur in equilibrium only if
competitors can cooperate in terms of investment. Then, standardisation and exclusivity
are equivalent options for rms as soon as quality cost exceeds a certain threshold. Besides,
we nd that positive network externalities have a negative eect on quality incentives in case
of exclusive platforms. With this, our ndings vary from D'Aspremont, C. and Jaquemin,
A.'s (1988): They claim that the lowest investment incentives occur for large spillovers. In
our setup, spillovers - which occur for interconnected platforms - provoke the highest in-
vestment incentives. It is that they change the mode of platform competition and induce a
quality race. In terms of welfare, we nd that coordination is undesirable if the intention
is to produce an optimal outcome. However, from the perspective of achieving second-best,
coordinated investment activities can be socially desirable corresponding to the ndings of
D'Aspremont, C. and Jaquemin, A. (1988).
In the following, we explain our analysis in more detail and proceed as follows: Section
2 contains the basic setup, Section 3 looks at competition for subscribers in case of in-
terconnected and non-interconnected platforms, Section 4 deals with the choice of quality
investments, Section 5 looks at the compatibility decision, Section 6 discusses and Section
7 concludes.
2 The Model
We look at competition between two platforms a 2 fA;Bg which serve as intermediaries
between two dierent types of agents i 2 f1;2g. Agents obtain utility from possible trans-
actions with (possibility of calling) opposite agents. Utilities are increasing in the expected
number of agents they can reach on the other side. Also, utilities depend on the quality of
transaction.
5 We are fully aware of the fact that other expectations will lead to dierent outcomes.
4The number of possible transactions is determined by the platforms' standardisation decision
which will allow them to interconnect or not. If they agree on a common standard both intra-
and inter-platform transactions can be realised. In other words, type 1 users of platform A
can both connect to type 2 users of the same platform and the rival platform B and vice
versa. The contrary holds if they decide against standardisation and therefore, operate inde-
pendently. Then, only transactions between members of the same platform can take place.
As a prerequisite for transactions agents need to subscribe to one of the platforms: For be-
ing part of platform a 2 fA;Bg an agent of type i 2 f1;2g has to pay the subscription fee pa
i .
Platforms:
Within this framework, platforms compete for subscribers (in order to earn the subscription
fee). They do so in a sequence of stages: As mentioned above, they rst have to agree
on a common standard or alternatively, decide to operate independently. Then, platforms
simultaneously determine their qualities which we denote by qA and respectively, qB. These
qualities aect the utility from transactions by dimensioning network externalities. We re-
strict our attention to qualities of limited positive value, i.e. qa 2 [0;q] with q < 3
4t. This
way, we examine the eect of positive network externalities when there is duopolistic plat-
form competition.6 After qualities are determined, both platforms a simultaneously set the
subscription fees pa
i for users i.
It is assumed that a platform's cost arises due to provided transaction quality, but facili-
tating transactions between users does not incur additional cost. Throughout our analysis
we use the example of C(qa) =  (qa)
2. With this, each platform a's quality cost C(qa) is
continuous, strictly increasing and convex in qa, i.e. C0(qa) > 0 and C00(qa)  0.
Furthermore, we assume that a platform's capacity is sucient to host all agents. Then, a
platform's prot is composed of the revenues from the number of agents 1 and 2 attracted





2   C(qa) (1)
with a 2 fA;Bg.
Agents:
There is a continuum of agents i 2 f1;2g with a total mass of 1. Agents' subscription
decisions are based on the payable fee, on individual tastes and, most importantly, the net
benets ua
i they derive from joining a platform a. We model individual preferences for a
platform with help of a Hotelling line where transportation cost ti reects the degree of
6 In principal, negative externalities seem to be adequate to describe real-world phenomenon, too. For
our particular example, negative eects could arise due to congestion or due to an increased probability
of virus attacks etc.. Yet, we do not further investigate this phenomenon as tendencies of our results
would not change. Reisinger, M. (2004) examines negative externalities from advertisements in the
media market as another example.
5product dierentiation for the two existent platform markets.7 We assume agents are uni-
formly distributed over the unit interval where platform A is located at 0 and B at 1. With
this, total utility amounts to the net benet of agent i belonging to platform a reduced
by the subscription fee and the transport cost tixi where xi 2 [0;1] represents the actual




i   tixi for i 2 f1;2g: (2)
Net benets are derived from possible transactions with the other type of agents. Therefore,
they vary with the platforms' choice of using a common standard or not as much as with
the quality which is provided for transactions. With a common standard, the possibility
that platform a's type i-users interact with all type j-subscribers on the other side arises. If
platforms decide to operate exclusively instead, only transactions between users of the same
platform can take place.
We assume that transaction quality over all amounts to the average quality of the platforms
involved. We believe this being appropriate to describe Internet transmission quality. Ac-
cordingly, we characterise inter-platform transactions by the sum of qualities qA and qB, and
intra-platform transactions by twice quality qA or qB. Denoting the case of standardisation
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0 if qa = 0
(3)















0 if qa = 0
(4)
in case of platforms which operate exclusively, with q = 0+, s.t.  > 0, lim = 0 and i 6= j,
a 6= b.8 With this, we specify the benets from transactions presuming that consumers do
not derive any benet from mere subscription to a platform, without transactions. Note
also that net benets comprise baseline utility v0 to ensure full participation of agents, i.e.
Ua
i  0.9
Besides, agents choose their preferred platform considering the expected market size on the
opposite platforms' sides: Coherently, NA
j represents the expected number of agents j on
platform A while NB
j = 1   NA
j stands for the expected number of agents on platform B.
7 Referring to network industries, one could also interpret them as switching cost, once subscription
decisions have been taken.
8 Hence, interconnection is modeled as a "quality spillover" to the other platform like in D'Aspremont,
C. and Jaquemin, A. (1988).
9 Therefore, v0 is assumed to be constant and the same for all net utilities so as to not aect our results
in the following.
6We maintain the following additional assumptions throughout our analysis:
Assumption 1. ft1;t2g < 2
3v0
to make sure all agents subscribe to one platform in equilibrium. Further,
Assumption 2. t1t2 > (qA + qB)2
and
Assumption 3. ft1;t2g  1:
With these, platforms' prots are always strictly concave in prices and thus, there exist
unique equilibria in the market stage.10 Additionally, we assume
Assumption 4. 0 <  <   16
9ti with i = f1;2g:
Then quality provision is costly, but does not exceed a level at which rms can run protably
in equilibrium.
In sum, we consider the following sequence of decisions: In the rst stage, platforms choose
whether to conform to a common standard as a pre-requisite for interconnection or not.
Then, they decide whether to cooperate in terms of quality investments and determine how
much they invest in quality (assuming simultaneous moves). Finally, platforms determine
subscription fees and agents choose which platform to subscribe to given their expectations
about the number of subscribers on the opposite side will be fullled.11
We will determine Nash equilibria of the game by solving it backwards in the following.
3 Market shares and prices
Market shares are determined by identifying the marginal consumers xi of the two market
sides i 2 f1;2g, who are indierent between joining network A or B, therefore, UA
i = UB
i .
With this and ni = nA
i + nB
i = 1, platform A's market share nA
i of agents i amounts to
xi = nA
i , while nB
i = 1   nA













dening the relationship between net utilities, subscription prices and ex-ante dierentiation
leading to agents' subscription choices. As mentioned above, we assume fullled expectations
in order to obtain an equilibrium outcome. This requires that users' expectations about
the network size Na
i will be fullled in equilibrium, thus, Na
i = na
i for all i 2 f1;2g and
10 This issue arises in case of no interconnection, see p. 8.
11 Cf. Katz, M. and Shapiro, C. (1985).
7a 2 fA;Bg. These subscription choices are considered by the platforms when determining
prot maximising price levels, i.e. equilibrium prices. Explicitly, each platform a's prot










Standardisation: Given that platforms agreed to use a common standard, users' subscription
choices are described by (3) combined with (5) under fullled expectations. This yields the
number of a platform's subscriptions with respect to those of its competitor. Simultaneously










































for i 2 f1;2g: (7)
Inspecting (6) and (7) the following is immediate:
Lemma 1. Given a common standard, each platform's market shares are independent of
the opposite side's prices. I.e. competition for i-type users takes place within one market
side and depends on prices pA
i and pB
i only.
Hence, network externalities and competition persist within one particular market side i.
This also becomes obvious when looking at the rst-order conditions to obtain prot max-

































for i 2 f1;2g describing two systems of two simultaneous conditions. Solving these systems
for equilibrium prices and re-inserting these values into (6) and (7) yields equilibrium market
shares. Expressing quality dierences by q = qA   qB we can, therefore, state:
Proposition 1. Given interconnection there exists a unique equilibrium in the market stage
where prices are given by
p
A;S




























Hence, it is solely a comparative advantage in qualities which feeds back into higher market
shares and prices, also in line with Lemma 1.12
Exclusivity: Similar to the previous case, condition (5) determines users' subscription choices
with net bents described by (4) when platforms act exclusively. Solving the conditions si-






















































































with T = t1t2   (qA + qB)2, i = f1;2g and i 6= j.13 Examining these, we conclude:
Lemma 2. Given exclusivity, each platform's market shares are determined by subscription
prices of both sides. I.e. a platform's market share of i-type users is determined by compe-
tition within and between market sides and depends on all prices pA
i and pB
i for i = f1;2g.
Here, in contrast to the case of platforms with a common standard, competition and ex-
ternalities aect the equilibrium outcome of both platform sides instead of one particular
















































with i;j 2 f1;2g and i 6= j yielding a system of four simultaneous conditions. Solving these
we nd:




i = ti  
2
3
(qA + 2qB) and p
B;E
i = ti  
2
3
(2qA + qB) (14)
12 The equilibrium outcome reects price competition  a la Bertrand as found in a one-sided market
13 Taking the second derivatives gives rise to Assumption 2: More precisely, we check the strict concavity
of prot functions with respect to the two prices the platform charges itself, Assumption 2, i.e. T > 0,
ensures negative deniteness of the corresponding Hessian.







































with T = t1t2   (qA + qB)2.
Proof: See Appendix.
Hence, prices for exclusive platforms are negatively aected by higher quality levels.14 Yet,
regarding market shares, quality eects are not as clear. Indeed, market shares as given in
(15) and (16) consist of two terms: The rst captures standard competitive eects within
a Hotelling framework. As a result, comparative quality advantages q, or, respectively,
 q will positively aect a platform's market shares. In contrast to that, the total level
of platforms' qualities have a negative impact on market shares in the second term. This
results from mutual eects between platform markets: The size of user group i aects user
j's subscription decision and vice versa. This leads to stronger competition for subscribers
the higher network externalities given that higher qualities increase network externalities.
Comparing, in general, the equilibrium outcomes of platform competition with and without
the possibility of interconnection, we can summarise in terms of prices and the direct eect
of qualities:





i for i 2 f1;2g. Moreover, a platform's own quality qa aects prices









In other words, price competition is stronger and leads to lower prices in case of exclusive
than in case of standardised platforms. As stated before, this result is driven by the way
network externalities inuence the outcome. Also referring to Lemma 1 and Lemma 2
we found that in case of standardised platforms there are only network eects within a
group whereas there are network eects within a user group i and between user groups of
opposite platform sides in case of exclusive platforms. We can, therefore, conclude that
14 Further rearranging rst-order conditions additionally shows:









t1   (qA + qB)
t2   (qA + qB)
:
This indicates that market price levels will be higher the less platforms compete (the higher ti). Further,
it reveals that higher qualities will always lead to a lower price structure on both sides of the platforms.
Note also, that there is room for subsidising one side of the platform while extracting prots from the
other side also i ti < qA + qB < tj.
10standardisation eliminates feedback eects.15 Even though a common standard eliminates
feedback eects and correspondingly, for exclusive platforms, there is a negative impact of
total qualities on platforms' market shares, we nd:









@qa > 0 for qa > qb.
I.e. that for the equilibrium outcome, in principal, total qualities have a positive eect on
market share. Considering that only in case of exclusivity, total qualities exert a negative
impact on market shares it is surprising that market shares as a whole, here, are raised with
higher qualities to a further extent than standardised platforms. We conclude that direct
network externalities within a platform side are relatively stronger for exclusive than for
standardised platforms due to full appropriation of these.16
4 Quality Investments
Based on the outcome of the precedingly solved market stage we examine incentives for
quality investments. We consider both non-cooperative and cooperative behaviour in this
framework following D'Aspremont, C. and Jaquemin, A. (1988). Note that for the remain-
ing part of this analysis we simplify our setup by assuming t1 = t2 = t in order to ease
computation and readability of results.17
4.1 Non-cooperative quality investments
To determine platforms' quality choices we look at each platform a's reduced prot function
a  
t;;qA;qB




qa a(t;;qa;qb) s:t: qa 2 [0;q]:
Standardisation: With equilibrium market shares and prices from (10) and (11) a platform





2    (qa)
2 (17)
with a;b 2 fA;Bg, a 6= b and q = qa   qb. Further examining a platform a's reaction to
changes in its own quality shows that its prots are not necessarily concave in its quality qa.
Instead of looking at rst-order conditions, we, therefore, dene Nash equilibria in terms of
15 This turns the platform market into a regular one-sided market.
16 Further comparative statics analysis in ti does not yield surprising results. For either standardisation
choice a higher degree of ex-ante dierentiation ti will lead to higher prices and lower elasticity of
market shares.
17 We claim that tendencies of results should not alter with this simplication as there are no real opposing
eects of switching cost t. Moreover, as we refer to telephone users in dierent countries, we claim that
mostly, individual tastes do not vary that much from country to country.
11mutual best-responses. As cost and, correspondingly, the functional form of a;S depends on
, equilibrium outcomes vary with the cost level  and the degree of horizontal dierentiation
t:
Lemma 4. The following types of equilibria emerge when platforms agree on a common
standard, but do not coordinate quality provision:
i. If   4






ii. If  > 4








for a;b 2 fA;Bg and a 6= b.
Proof: See Appendix.
Looking at Looking at (10) and (11) gives the intuition for this result: Obviously, plat-
forms gain only if they outperform their rival. Therefore, they enter a quality race when
competing with each other. As long as quality cost are relatively moderate such quality
competition induces both platforms to provide the largest quality level allowed. If quality
provision is more costly, investment occurs until marginal revenues equate marginal cost.
Yet, considering that extra gains occur for comparative advantages only, these outcomes do
not constitute prot-maximising equilibria. Interestingly, outcomes represent a prisoners'
dilemma situation as a consequence of market stage competition.18
Exclusivity: Analogue to the case of standardisation, we use equilibrium market shares and




























with a;b 2 A;B and a 6= b.19 We derive the prot function with respect to qa;E to obtain a
platform a's reaction function. Using qA = qB = q, we conclude:
Lemma 5. Suppose rms operate exclusively and determine qualities non-cooperatively,
18 For a symmetric outcome, platforms do not gain from providing higher qualities since only dierences
will matter. Given symmetry, prot maximisation becomes a question of cost minimisation leading to
minimum quality levels.
19 The corresponding second-order conditions are t1 + t2 < 18t1t2 which always holds for all t  1, see
Assumption 3.







Essentially, this occurs because higher qualities raise network eects: Even though stronger
direct network eects make each platform more valuable for users it leads to stronger price
competition with a substantial decrease in prices due to feedback eects from one platform
side to the other. This decrease in subscription prices due to a higher quality always dom-
inates the gain in market share. Therefore, raising its quality will not be protable for a
platform at any cost level. It will withdraw from investment activity as much as possible in
order to reduce network eects and soften competition.20
With this, we nally, can compare equilibrium quality levels given platforms' decision
whether to conform to a common standard:







Reasons for this outcome have already been given above. When platforms have a common
standard, they will attempt to gain a comparative advantage so that quality provision is
above the minimum level. In contrast to that, when platforms operate exclusively, they aim
to reduce network eects between user groups so as to alleviate ercer price competition
in case of incompatibility. For that reason they keep qualities at a minimum.21 (This
outcome is somewhat surprising as a common standard allows for quality spillovers: Results
contradict D'Aspremont, C. and Jaquemin, A. (1988) and the frequently used claim to
further investment incentives by allowing for the appropriation of investments.)
4.2 Cooperative quality investments
Still following D'Aspremont, C. and Jaquemin, A. (1988), we look at quality outcomes
when platforms coordinate themselves during the investment stage while competition for
subscribers remains non-cooperative. Then, quality choices depend on joint prots AB =
A + B given platforms' decision about a common standard.
Standardisation: We obtain joint prots AB;S in case platforms conform to a common
standard by using (17). Looking at rst and second derivatives shows that joint prots
are only concave in qualities if   AB  2
9t. If this condition holds, prot maximising
20 In fact, platforms would aim to reduce dominant indirect network externalities to a certain extent, so
that - if allowed - the would provide for negative qualities.
21 In fact, if we permitted negative qualities such as conscious delay or interruption of transmission, the
equilibrium qualities would amount to qA;E = qB;E =   1
6.
13quality levels qA and qB, as usual, are derived by help of rst-order conditions. Otherwise,
prots are convex. Then, we conclude on equilibrium quality levels considering functional
properties of AB;S, in particular, @
AB;S
@(qa)2 > 0 and @
AB;S
@qAqB < 0. Denoting the provided level
of qualities in case of coordinated investment with qa
AB and qb
AB for fa;bg 2 fA;Bg and
a 6= b, we nd:
Lemma 6. The following types of equilibria emerge when platforms agree on a common
standard and coordinate their quality provision:
1. If  < AB, coordinated investment will lead to the highest quality dierentiation feasible
with qualities
qa = q and qb = q
.








It shows that coordination can resolve the prisoner's dilemma situation of non-cooperative
quality investments leading to collusion on cost minimising quality levels if joint prots are
concave. If, however, joint prots are convex in a quality qa, maintaining networks with
maximal vertical dierentiation proves to be the prot maximising strategy. It is that with
 < AB additional cost of raising quality qa is lower than the marginal return. Since
@
@qa@qb < 0 it is that a higher quality qa raises joint prots the most, the lower the other
platform's quality qb with fa;bg 2 fA;Bg and a 6= b.
Exclusivity: Joint prots AB;E are determined considering (18). With the negative ef-
fect of a higher quality on a platform's prots, quality incentives are the same for individual
and joint prot maximisation, therefore:
Lemma 7. In order to maximise joint prots, exclusive platforms refrain from quality in-









Such investment behaviour is driven by the unambiguous and dominant negative price eect
for higher qualities due to externalities opposite user groups exert on each other.
Comparing the outcomes of cooperative and non-cooperative investment behaviour, we nd:
Proposition 4. Let  < AB. Then, the joint amount of platforms' investments is higher












AB . For   AB, neither







AB = q with a 2 fA;Bg.
Proof: See Appendix.
This result is rather unsurprising: In case platforms operate exclusively higher qualities are
unambiguously associated with decreasing prots. Therefore, only minimum qualities will
be provided. In case platforms operate on a common standard, the outcome depends on the
cost of quality provision: If quality provision is costly, only minimum qualities in order to
minimise cost will be provided. But for lower cost, there is the possibility of higher joint
prots by exploiting network eects: Then, maintaining large asymmetries proves itself prot
maximising and aggregate qualities exceed the provided quality level of exclusive platforms.
5 Standardisation or Exclusivity
In our basic setup platforms' choice whether to use a common standard or not is the initial
stage. For expositional purposes we additionally look at the possibility of standardisation af-
ter qualities are chosen. With this, we can compare the outcome in terms of standardisation
from a long-term view (our original setup) and from a short-term view. To nd out whether
platforms favour standardisation or not we compare platforms' prots in light of this deci-
sion. If equilibrium prots of standardised platforms are higher than the ones of exclusive
platforms, they will agree to a common standard. Note that we abstract from side-payments
or other details concerning the design of contracts between platforms when examining co-
ordinated investment activities. Comparing total industry prots already indicates whether
agreeing to a common standard will cause larger gains for both platforms.
5.1 Short-Term Decision
Comparing prots after competition in the market stage took place as stated in (17) and
(18), we nd that
a;S > a;E
for all a 2 fA;Bg. This holds no matter whether the same or diering qualities are provided.
The reason is that the higher a platform's quality the larger is its competitivity towards its
rival. In case of standardised platforms this aects both the platform's market shares and its
prices positively. These positive eects due to higher competitivity are, in aggregate, oset
by stronger competition due to a higher quality level in case of exclusivity: The negative
impact of higher qualities on prices outweighs a slightly stronger increase in a platform's
market share compared to the case of a common standard:
Lemma 8. Platforms are mutually interested in standardisation and they would always
agree on a common standard in the market stage.
15With a common standard both platforms acquire higher prots as prices for some given
qualities are always higher compared to exclusivity. Even though quality investments of
exclusive platforms solely benet the investing platform, there are fewer gains from higher
qualities. This is due to positive network externalities between user groups on opposite sides
and inter-platform competition.
5.2 Long-Term Decision
Platforms' quality choices and, accordingly, its prots vary in the scale of quality cost
measured by . By comparing prots after qualities were determined we conclude:
Proposition 5. Choosing a common standard and collusion in qualities is always an option
for platforms. For cost with   AB this option is equivalent to operating exclusively.
Proof: See Appendix.
Hence, if   AB, platforms merely aim to maintain platform usage but do not have any
incentives for further quality improvements. This can be realised by cooperating in terms
of qualities when platforms agreed on a common standard, and likewise by operating exclu-
sively. Below AB, it is also collusion of standardised platforms which will unambiguously
return the highest level of total industry prots. But then, increasing returns to scale are
exploited by feigning monopolistic tendencies as far as quality provision is concerned. This
leads to more than minimal quality provision.
6 Welfare
We compare the social eciency of the various outcomes we analysed in the previous section.
Welfare is, as usual, dened as the sum of agents' surpluses, thus









With this, welfare implications are driven by agents' net utilities reduced by their trans-
portation cost t and the cost of quality provision. 22 The above stated welfare function
reects higher social eciency due to improved consumer welfare if we consider results of
the quality stage.23 Let WS and WE denote social welfare in case of non-cooperative quality
decisions with and without a common standard. We compare this outcome to WS;AB and
22 Note that due to the assumptions made there is no additional insight by analysing short-term outcomes,
i.e. equilibrium outcomes after market stage, but before quality competition. Here, with symmetric
outcomes, social surplus is always higher in case of standardisation due to additional network benets
in subscribers' utilities.
23 As we restricted our attention to symmetric outcomes, there is the suspicion that within a Hotelling
model of dierentiation total surplus remains the same in all cases but prices determine the distribution
of surplus. Yet, this reasoning does not apply for our setup as agents' utility raises with higher total
quality, thus, welfare comparisons might point to a socially desirable outcome in terms of investment.
16WE;AB denoting coordinated quality investments in view of standardisation or exclusivity.
We nd:
Proposition 6. A common standard is socially most desirable as long as platforms do not
coordinate their quality provision. For low cost of quality provision with  < AB a common
standard with coordinated quality provision proves itself more ecient than exclusive ar-
rangements. If quality provision is rather costly with   AB both coordination in qualities
and exclusivity are socially undesirable.
Proof: See Appendix.
In other words, the social eciency of a common standard and cooperative quality provision
depends on the cost level: For rather low cost, standardisation always proves itself more
benecial to welfare than exclusivity due to investment incentives. Indeed, quality compe-
tition of standardised platforms yields the highest quality provision and correspondingly,
the highest consumer surplus. It is, therefore, welfare maximising. Coordinated quality
provision proves itself the second-best outcome, as it results in high quality dierentiation
where one platform makes greatest eorts to provide high transaction quality. Higher so-
cial welfare is achieved compared to the case of platform exclusivity: The ensuing market
structure actually produces incentives to disinvest in qualities so that exclusivity becomes
socially least desirable in terms of qualities and overall welfare. If quality provision is rather
costly, coordination of quality investment bears the collusive danger of maintaining lowest
quality levels.
7 Discussion
The results we obtained apply for our specic setup with duopolistic platform competition
and full participation. In this section, we discuss these assumption pointing to further as-
pects which seem interesting to analyse.
Local and long-distance competition
Considering that we relate our specic setup to competition of VoIP-providers in the long-
distance market, the objection that such providers compete both in long-distance and local
markets at the same time is immediate. Our approach simply looked at platform interaction
from the perspective of one particular market (the market for long-distance calls). If we
extended our framework to consider local competition, it should be most likely that direct
network externalities within one market side would gain importance. Provided that these
tendencies are not overwhelming, still results would be driven by the interplay and existence
of network eects within and between markets driven by the decision to enable interconnec-
tion or not. Hence, qualitative results should not be aected.
Asymmetric competition, sequential quality choices and partial participation
17Our results build on symmetric starting points for platform competitors. We motivated
this situation by referring to the situation of new telecommunication platforms like VoIP
providers. Given prospects of converging telecommunications, i.e. growing competition be-
tween dierentiated platforms, there are various possibilities of extending our discussion.
E.g. when switching cost play a substantial role, sequential decisions seem more adequate.
Given sequential quality choices and alleviating restrictions on quality investments, entry
deterrence becomes an issue. We nd that, in this context, an exclusively operating plat-
form requires lower quality eort to deter its rival's entry than a standardised platform.
This result is not surprising since interoperability allows for a certain degree of "free-riding"
on the other platform's quality. With this, more eort is required to induce market exit of
the competitor.
One could, further, imagine market expansion with the arrival of new telecommunication
services. From a consumption perspective, one could, in this regard, discuss partial mar-
ket coverage. We suppose that such a situation could make collusion on symmetric quality
levels more dicult because it would reinforce competition for the 'users at the margin'.
We would expect further asymmetries induced by a change in quality incentives. Yet, the
question whether assuming full or partial market coverage is more appropriate is an empir-
ical question and crucially depends on our market denition and the country we look at.
Theoretically, it remains an open question whether such a situation could resolve collusion
on low qualities.
Entry and coalitions
In light of the discussion of market dynamics, entry of additional platforms is an aspect to
look into. Here, it might be interesting to raise the question in what way coalitions will arise
to lower entry barriers.
Details of standardisation agreements
So far, we have looked at platforms' agreement on a common standard or not. Consider-
ing the possibility of asymmetric outcomes and coordination, commitment and the design
of contracts will play an essential role to realise the depicted outcomes. Here, bargaining,
outside options and other contractual aspects are an area of further research.
8 Conclusion
In this paper, we examined how common standards as a prerequisite for interconnection will
aect platform competition. We compared pricing behaviour of platforms operating under
a common standard and platforms operating exclusively. We looked at incentives for higher
network quality as a result of market stage competition and the possibility of coordination.
Restricting our view to market stage competition, we found that platforms would agree on
a common standard in order to mitigate platform competition: This would lead to softer
18competition for subscribers and higher prices compared to the case when platforms operate
exclusively. Such phenomenon occurs as in case of exclusivity externalities between plat-
form sides exert a downward pressure on prices. When enabling interconnection, this eect
is eliminated. Nevertheless, choosing interconnection is not necessarily platforms' equilib-
rium choice if the outcome of quality investments are considered. Then, only in case of
coordinated quality provision, platforms nd a common standard protable.
This outcome contrasts the political target of achieving higher quality provision correspond-
ing to higher social welfare in our setup. Here, the highest quality provision is guaranteed
if platforms agree on interconnection, but do not coordinate their investment activities.
It is then that competing platforms enter a quality race leading to high qualities of both
platforms. Most surprisingly, exclusivity of platforms cannot spur quality incentives even
though it enables full appropriability of quality investments. The reason is that higher qual-
ities lead to reinforced competition for subscribers and lower subscription prices. Facing this
situation, platforms would prefer to disinvest in order to soften competition. From a wel-
fare perspective, quality coordination, particularly, as standardised platforms are concerned,
might not lead to the socially most desirable outcome. Yet, its social desirability varies with
the actual level of quality cost: If rather low, coordination leads to the second-best outcome
where platforms provide dierent quality levels above the minimum quality. But if quality
provision is rather costly, coordination bears the danger of collusive least-quality provision.
These results suggest that there is not necessarily a need to reinforce interoperability be-
tween competing networks. Yet, one should be aware of possible collusion on low qualities
as a result of platforms' long-term decisions. Hence, our results are, in principal, in line with
present European policy which does not explicitly interfere in terms of interoperability, but
still recommends it. Yet, the interdependency with collusion in investment and, in partic-
ular, the role of quality cost, do not seem to be explicitly considered. Our ndings imply
that cooperation in terms of quality investments cannot achieve the most ecient outcome
and even could lead to collusive underinvestment if quality provision is rather costly. Yet,
considering the possibility of quality advances at low cost, allowing for coordination could
ensure the second-best outcome with respect to welfare and consumer surplus. It suggests
that prohibiting cartels is an appropriate measure from the perspective of welfare maximi-
sation if we assume high investment cost. Yet, it raises the question whether this attitude
should be reconsidered, explicitly dealing with cost measures and the underlying market
structure, aiming to achieve the second best outcome.
With this, our ndings leave the design of interconnection agreements to balance the aims
of lower prices, higher qualities and lower cost to a further discussion. Considering the up-
rise of numerous co-existent networks, nowadays, the emergence and eect of coalitions also
could be discussed. As far as pricing is concerned, we imagine discriminatory prices, but
also transfer payments between platforms and agents aspects relating our analysis further
to real-world situations.
199 Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1:
Utilities of subscribers in case of interconnected platforms can be described as
U
A;S
i = v0 + 2qAn
A;S
j + (qA + qB)(1   n
A;S
j )   p
A;S
i   tixi; (19)
U
B;S
i = v0 + 2qBn
B;S
j + (qA + qB)(1   n
B;S
j )   p
B;S
i   ti(1   xi) (20)
with n
B;S
i = 1   n
A;S
i . Market shares are determined by identifying the marginal consumer
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also given in (6) and (7). These results have to be taken into account when platforms set










































Solving simultaneously two systems of two rst-order-conditions results in equilibrium
p
A;S







































20Proof of Proposition 2:
If platforms operate exclusively, agents' utilities are given by (2) and (4). Market shares are














































































2   (qB)2 (24)























































































2T (qA + qB)p
A;E
1 = 0:








2t2  t2 2(qA + qB)  (qA + qB)
t2  2t2 (qA + qB)  2(qA + qB)
2(qA + qB)  (qA + qB) 2t1  t1


































t1t2 + t2(qA   qB)   2qB(qA + qB)
 t1t2 + t2(qA   qB) + 2qA(qA + qB)
t1t2 + t1(qA   qB)   2qB(qA + qB)





Solving for individual prices and rearranging yields
p
A;E


























Considering this, we insert the equilibrium prices into market shares described by the indif-






































as in (15) and (16). To ensure the existence equilibria, concavity of prots in prices is a
sucient condition, therefore, we assume t1t2 > (qB + qA)2 so that T > 0.
q.e.d
Proof of Lemma 3:








@qa > 0 for qa > qb we compare equilibrium market shares for
symmetric qualities qa = qb with the outcome for qa > qb:
It is obvious from (11), (15) and (16) that for qa = qb equilibrium market shares amount to
na

























which holds by assumption.
q.e.d
Proof of Lemma 4:
If   4=9 marginal revenues always exceed marginal cost, i.e. @Ra;S=@qa  @Ca;S=@qa 














= q constitutes a Nash
equilibrium. Analogously to the above described case, mutual best responses of a platform








where platforms do not have a unilateral incentive to deviate.
q.e.d
Proof of Lemma 5:
To derive results for exclusively operating platforms, let us look at the eect of a higher































































  2qa < 0
assuming a symmetric equilibrium, i.e. qa = qb = q, and given the restricted quality range





= q results in equilibrium.
q.e.d
Proof of Proposition 3:










Proof of Lemma 6:















































This condition holds for  > 2
9t. Therefore, the prot function is concave for   2
9t for














  2A = 0 : (26)






In case of  < 2
9t, we have a closer look at the the second-order conditions in terms of
platform qualities. It is that
@2AB;S
(@qa)





@qa@qb < 0 if  <
2
9t
revealing convexity in one platform's quality qa, but strategic substitutability between the
two qualities qA and qB. With that, maximal quality dierentiation is prot maximising








with fa;bg 2 fA;Bg and a 6= b.
q.e.d
Proof of Lemma 7:
See Lemma 5.
Proof of Proposition 4:
Results follow immediately from Lemma 6 and Lemma 7.
q.e.d
Proof of Proposition 5:
It is that if  < AB the following order of total industry prots holds:
24AB;S > A;E + B;E = AB;E > A;S + B;S:
If   AB the ranking of prots changes to
AB;S = A;E + B;E = AB;E > A;S + B;S:
q.e.d
Proof of Proposition 6:













We use this formulae to calculate welfare using the equilibrium qualities calculated in Section
4. Then, if  < AB we obtain
WS > WS;AB > WE;AB = WE:
For higher cost levels characterised by   AB this ranking changes to
WS > WS;AB = WE;AB = WE:
q.e.d
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